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I. INTRODUCTION
We have recently entered a great new age of genetics. The Human Genome
Project, officially begun in 1990, is a fifteen-year, international research effort
to map and sequence all of the human genome, including the estimated 100,000
human genes. As a result of this research, our knowledge of human genetics
will expand exponentially, thereby promising to improve the quality of life and
giving hope that even some of the most dreaded diseases can be cured.
Nevertheless, as we accumulate vast amounts of genetic information on an
individual and aggregate basis, there are legitimate concerns that this
information could be misused.
My goal is to provide a broad overview of some of the ways in which genetic
information may be used for nonmedical purposes. Before I get to this specific
topic, however, I want to briefly note, for definitional reasons, the various
medical uses of genetic information. These include diagnosis, reproductive
planning, disease prevention, treatment, and research. These uses, of course,
raise numerous legal and ethical issues, including informed consent, privacy,
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confidentiality, duty to warn, public health screening, and medical malpractice.
These topics, however, are beyond the scope of this lecture.
When one thinks about the use of genetic information by third parties for
nonmedical purposes, one of the first things that comes to mind is the question
of how the third party can gain access to the information. There are three main
ways. First, and most importantly, the third party may obtain records
developed in the clinical setting. In other words, if someone wants a job or
insurance, that person may be required to sign a release authorizing the third
party to access those records. Second, the genetic records might be obtained
through a genetic data bank. Third, the third party may actually perform
genetic testing itself or ask questions that elicit genetic information indirectly
through family histories.
I will address the following eight nonmedical uses of genetic information:
(1) identification, (2) employment, (3) insurance, (4) commercial transactions,
(5) domestic relations, (6) education, (7) criminal justice, and (8) tort litigation.
II. SPECIFIC AREAS OF POSSIBLE USE OF GENETIC INFORMATION
A. Identification
Although Iam primarily concerned with the identification of specific human
beings, I should note that DNA identification techniques maybe useful in other
areas as well. For example, recently in Japan DNA tests were performed on
whale meat. The tests indicated that some of the whale meat being sold was
from humpback whales, which are on the endangered species list. The
authorities used the information to track down the individuals who were
trafficking in illegal whale meat.
One of the most common uses of human genetic information is in criminal
forensics (although I will have more to say about the nonforensic application
of DNA technologies later). Essentially, criminal investigators use DNA
evidence to determine whether samples from criminal suspects match
biological evidence, such as blood on walkways outside condominiums, found
at the scene of a crime. Seventeen states already mandate DNA profiling
(loosely referred to as DNA fingerprinting) of all convicted felons. The FBI also
has a growing DNA data bank. The proliferation of criminal databases raises
concerns about privacy and confidentiality and whether in criminal
investigations the police literally will "round up the usual suspects."
DNA identification techniques are also used in the identification of dead
bodies. DNA samples of all military personnel are now taken for identification
purposes. Indeed, the military DNA data banks were first used to identify
human remains in the Gulf War. Privacy concerns, similar to those of law
enforcement data banks, are raised in connection with these data banks
primarily limiting who has access to the information. DNA testing is also
utilized for identifying the victims of plane crashes.
Furthermore, DNA information determines parentage with much greater
certainty than information from prior technology does. This information is
important not only to paternity testing but to testing that already is used to
reunite children with their parents or grandparents after being separated by
war or political oppression.
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Fourth, genetic identification methods may be used to determine heirship.
Unlike blood-based tests, DNA testing may be performed on any available
tissue. Therefore, DNA testing can be done posthumously, which raises
interesting issues about heirship.
B. Employment
There are two main ways in which genetic information is useful to
employers. Some genetic traits make individuals more susceptible to
occupational diseases. For example, alpha-l-antitrypsin deficiency, the lack of
a protective serum protein, greatly increases the risk of emphysema and other
lung disorders. Employers might consider this risk factor in deciding which
individuals to assign to work in dusty environments.
The more likely use of genetic information by employers, however, involves
diseases unrelated to workplace exposures. Employers concerned with
controlling escalating health care costs may be interested in knowing whether
an individual is likely to contract a nonoccupational illness in the future. In any
given year, five percent of health care claimants represent fifty percent of health
care costs; ten percent of health care claimants represent seventy percent of
health care costs. Consequently, if an employer could identify beforehand the
people who were likely to become seriously ill and exclude these people (or
their dependents), the employer could save a tremendous amount of money
on health benefits.
The exclusion of current or potential employees because of concerns about
future health costs raises serious legal questions. Nine states have enacted laws
that specifically prohibit genetic discrimination in employment. Some of the
laws are limited to particular genetic traits, while others define "genetic" more
broadly. In my view, the enactment of specific genetic discrimination legislation
is not the best way to proceed. Such legislation often fails to resolve
fundamental problems, including the core issue of how to define "genetic." The
most promising approach is to apply more general disability discrimination
laws.
At the federal level, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to all
employers with fifteen or more employees in the private as well as the public
sector. Federal government employees, however, are excluded from coverage
under the ADA, but they are protected under section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act. Under the ADA there is a three-part definition of an individual with a
disability: 1) an individual with a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life activities; 2) an
individual who has a record of such an impairment (e.g., someone who had
cancer and is now in remission); or 3) an individual who is regarded as having
such an impairment (e.g., an individual who has no impairment but who is
perceived as having an impairment).
Individuals with expressed genetic illnesses are clearly covered under the
ADA. The difficult questions are whether the ADA covers someone who is
presymptomatic for a late onset genetic disease, someone who has a genetically
increased risk of a multifactorial disorder such as cancer or heart disease, or
someone who is the unaffected carrier of a recessive or X-linked disorder. In
the latter situation, the individual will not be affected, but his or her offspring
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may be and, as covered dependents under a health benefits plan, might have
substantial future claims.
The ADA is silent on the issue of genetic conditions, and there is little
authoritative discussion in the legislative history. It was not until March 1995
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) stated that
individuals who are subject to discrimination in employment because of a
genetic predisposition to disease are "regarded" as having a disability and
therefore are covered under the third part of the definition of "individual with
a disability."
Closely related to the permissible use of genetic information by employers
is the issue of how employers gain access to genetic information. Aside from
performing the tests themselves (currently not done for financial and other
reasons and an unlikely prospect for the near term), there are two main ways.
At the preemployment stage, before an offer of employment has been extended,
employers are not permitted to make any inquiries about whether the
individual has a disability or the nature and extent of any disabilities. At the
"preplacement stage," however, after an employer makes an offer of
employment conditioned on the individual undergoing a medical
examination, the employer may require a medical examination of unlimited
scope. These medical examinations need not be limited to assessing job-related
physical or mental capacities.
At the same time, the conditional offerees also can be required to sign a
release, authorizing their personal health care providers to disclose all of their
medical records. These medical records, of course, could contain the results of
genetic tests or other genetic information. The ADA provides that a conditional
offer of employment may not be withdrawn based on medical information
unless the medical information is job related and bears directly on whether the
individual is able to perform essential job functions. Nevertheless, simply
permitting access to the information will often make it extremely difficult to
ensure that the information is not used.
The second way in which employers may obtain genetic information is
through health insurance claims. Employer-provided health insurance is either
purchased through a commercial insurer or Blue Cross/Blue Shield or through
self-insurance. If an employer is self-insured, then the employer itself acts as
the insurer, bearing the risks and paying the claims directly. When employees
submit health insurance claims, the health care providers indicate a diagnosis
or check a diagnostic code. In this way, the employer can learn the nature of
the medical conditions for which the employee and any covered dependents
are receiving treatment.
There are a variety of ways in which the employer may act on the basis of
the health insurance claims data aside from the most drastic (and unlawful)
step of discharging the employee. In fact, the employer does not even need to
have the information in personally identifiable form to take action adverse to
the employee's interests. For example, the employer's benefits department
may determine that it is paying for a few very high cost diseases or procedures
that, if eliminated from the employer's benefits package, would save
thousands of dollars each year. Or the benefits department might determine
that dependent coverage is costing a tremendous amount of money and should
be discontinued.
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Although state insurance laws frequently mandate that all policies written
in the state cover certain medical conditions and limit the situations in which
policies may be cancelled, self-insured employers are not subject to these laws.
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts these
state insurance laws as to self-insured employers. Under ERISA, self-insured
health benefit plans may be amended or discontinued altogether at any time,
so long as the employer is not doing so as a subterfuge for disability
discrimination (in violation of the ADA) and so long as the employer complies
with the necessary notice provisions in the particular plan agreement it has
drafted.
The impact of ERISA is important to consider. Most major employers in the
United States are self-insured, including ninety percent of employers with
20,000 or more employees, eighty-two percent of employers with 5,000 or more
employees, and over half of all employees. The problems raised by using health
insurance claims data are not unique to genetic information. What is unique is
the ability of employers to use genetic information to predict future health costs
before claims are even filed.
C. Insurance
About eighty-five percent of Americans under age sixty-five are covered by
health insurance of some kind. Of those who are covered, eighty-five to ninety
percent are covered by group insurance. Of those people who have group
insurance, about seventy percent obtain their group insurance through
employment, either as the employee or as the dependent of an employee. That
means that only ten to fifteen percent of insured individuals are covered under
individual health insurance policies.
The central role of employers in our health insurance system arose by
happenstance. During World War II, to prevent runaway wage inflation caused
by labor shortages, wage and price controls were established. Because
employees could not get wage increases, employers (frequently as a result of
collective bargaining) provided employees with additional fringe benefits. The
first fringe benefit at many companies was hospitalization coverage. Since
World War II, the coverages have become increasingly comprehensive,
increasingly generous (extending to dependents and retirees and covering
physician visits, allied health services, eyeglasses, hearing aids, and other
devices), and increasingly expensive.
Traditionally, medical underwriting was only used by insurance companies
for individual insurance policies, the rationale being that, on the average,
employees and their dependents were at least as healthy as the general
population. Because the same can not be said of applicants for individual health
insurance coverage, medical assessments of risk were used. This practice of
medical underwriting, however, has recently spread into the small group
insurance market. Many small employers with a high claims history or in
perceived high risk industries or locations are unable to obtain health insurance
at standard rates, if at all.
Medical underwriting for individual health insurance is driven by the
principle of adverse selection. Individuals who know they are likely to need
health insurance are the most likely ones to seek it. To prevent individuals from
seeking health insurance based on medical information known only to the
1994-95]
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applicant, insurance companies seek to have access to the same medical
information as the individual. And this medical information includes genetic
information. To prevent genetic-based discrimination in health insurance,
twelve states have enacted legislation that specifically prohibits health
insurance companies from using genetic information to exclude individuals
from coverage.
Similar issues of adverse selection are raised in the context of life insurance.
If someone knows that he is going to die in a year, one of the first things he
might do is try to take out $10 million of life insurance at standard rates. If
everyone could do this, life insurance companies would either go out of
business or they would raise their rates so high that life insurance would be
prohibitively expensive. Thus, avoiding adverse selection is considered key to
the viability of life insurance.
Morally, is there a difference between health insurance and life insurance? I
think few people would consider life insurance to be a necessity today, whereas
I think most people would say that health insurance is. Yet, allowing any
insurance company to obtain access to increasingly sophisticated genetic
information could have extremely deleterious consequences to public health.
Individuals at risk of genetic illnesses might forego genetic testing for fear of
being denied insurance coverage. "
In the Netherlands, life insurance companies have started a five-year
experiment in which individuals are considered for life insurance policies up
to 200,000 guilders (about $100,000) without any medical inquiries. One
advantage of treating genetic risks the same as other medical risks is that it
avoids the difficult problem of defining exactly what a genetic test or condition
is. For example, is a simple blood test that reveals inherited
hypercholesterolemia a genetic test? Although American insurance companies
are vehemently opposed to issuing policies without medical underwriting,
individual life insurance policies in very small amounts (typically $5,000)
already are available without medical underwriting. Nevertheless, I am not
aware of any studies which attempt to measure empirically the monetary level
at which adverse selection pressures become unacceptably high.
D. Commercial Transactions
Forensics, employment, and insurance are the three areas that quickly come
to mind in the use of genetic information for nonmedical purposes. The other
five areas I am going to discuss are less commonly considered, but all of them
could be significant.
If you think about it, any third party with an economic interest in the future
health of an individual automatically has an interest in the individual's future
health-and consequently his or her genetic profile. For example, if a person
applies for a thirty-year mortgage, the mortgage company would certainly
want to know if that person is going to be alive in thirty years. The same can
be said of any commercial loan or various business ventures.
It seems to me that it may only be a matter of time before commercial entities
demand access to genetic information. Currently, there are no legal limitations
on the ability of lenders or other commercial entities to require or use medical,
including genetic, information. Even though this is not common practice today,
there is little basis for assuming that it will not take place in the future.
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E. Domestic Relations
There are three ways in which genetic information could be used in domestic
relations. The first involves premarital genetic assessment of the partners,
especially with regard to recessive disorders. Although this directly relates to
reproductive planning, which I said at the outset would be beyond the scope
of this talk, I would like to mention just one example. In New York City,
Orthodox Jews have established a program called Dor Yeshorim. Each
unmarried young person undergoes genetic testing for Tay Sachs disease,
Canavan disease, and Gaucher's disease, but they are not told of the result.
They are merely given a code number. When a couple is proposed to marry
(often through arranged marriages), the central registry is called and told the
two numbers. The registry then indicates whether the proposed match would
be a "good" one or not. The number of rich ethical issues raised by screening
programs such as this one are evident.
A second area of domestic relations that could be affected by genetic
information is child custody disputes. The following example was related to
me by my colleague, Professor Lori B. Andrews of the Chicago-Kent College
of Law. In April 1994, a South Carolina divorce lawyer was approached by a
client with a troubling request. There was a custody battle over the client's
daughter, and the client wanted his ex-wife to be tested for the Huntington's
disease gene. Because the ex-wife's mother had died of Huntington's disease,
the ex-wife was at a fifty percent risk of developing this invariably fatal,
late-onset, dominant neurological disorder. If she tested positive for the
Huntington's gene, then the ex-husband was going to argue that his ex-wife
should not be granted custody of their child because she would be unable to
care for the child after she developed symptoms.
Interestingly, the ex-husband's lawyer was a former genetic counselor, and
she realized that getting a court order requiring genetic testing was not
necessarily the best thing to do. She knew that most people who are at risk for
Huntington's disease do not elect to be tested for both economic (fear of losing
employment and insurance) and psychological reasons. The lawyer also was
concerned about her own potential liability if, on her motion, the ex-wife were
tested, found out she had the Huntington's gene, and then jumped off a bridge.
To make a long story short, the motion to compel testing was filed, and it was
granted by the court. But the mother fled the jurisdiction with the child before
the testing took place.
In other cases, it may be that a parent will come into court after voluntarily
being tested. He or she might argue that, having gotten a "clean" bill of genetic
health, this fact should be considered by the court. Courts consider various
factors in determining what is in the best interest of the child, including the
health of the parents and whether one parent smokes. It is quite possible that
genetic information also might be considered.
Genetic information also could be of great interest in adoption proceedings.
Each of the interested parties in an adoption-the biological parents, the child,
and the adoptive parents-might be subject to genetic testing. Twenty-two
states already require genetic and other available medical information from
biological parents to predict the health risks of the child. As direct DNA testing
becomes available for more genetic conditions, parental testing will be
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unnecessary because the child can be tested directly. Eight states currently
require genetic information about an adoptive child, and forty-nine out of the
fifty states (Nevada being the exception) require more general health and
medical information about the child without specifically mentioning genetic
information.
What happens when the child being placed for adoption tests positive for a
genetic disorder? Is it moral or should it be legal for adopting parents to say, in
effect, we are no longer interested in adopting this child because the child is
going to develop a certain disease in the future? Is there some minimum
standard of genetic merchantability for adoptive children, or is this making
children into commodities? Although there is a natural inclination to say that
children are adopted on an "as is" basis, I suggest that the issue is more
complicated than it might appear.
Suppose that a couple is about to adopt a child and the adoption agency says
that the child to be adopted has the gene for Tay Sachs disease and is going to
die around age two after a very terrible, painful, miserable existence. Does the
couple have to go through with the adoption? Suppose the reason the couple
was adopting a child is that they already had a child die of Tay Sachs disease?
Is it unreasonable or morally repugnant for the couple to say that they could
not handle adopting this child?
On the other hand, suppose that the child carried the gene for a late-onset
disorder, such as Huntington's disease, which is fatal, but has a median age of
onset of forty, or Alzheimer's disease, which would not manifest until even
later in life? Suppose it is a treatable disorder, such as hemochromatosis? Or
suppose the child merely has a genetic predisposition to cancer or heart
disease? It seems to me that it may be very difficult to draw the lines for legal
regulation of genetic testing in adoption.
The theory of testing adoptive parents, which is also a possibility, is similar
to the one I raised earlier with regard to child custody. That is, a late-onset
disorder would interfere with the ability to be a good parent. The courts have
upheld considering the adoptive parent's age, and they have upheld
considering the health status of adoptive parents. Why not also consider the
likely future health of adoptive parents by looking into their genetic profile.
F Education
Genetic information could be used at every stage of education, from
preschool to graduate school. As to younger children, genetic testing may be
used to identify children with a genetic trait or predisposition to learning
disabilities, such as dyslexia. Based on genotype alone, children might be
placed in certain educational tracks before they have had a chance to
demonstrate their ability or their motivation, making those tracks self-fulfilling
prophecies for the child.
Fragile X syndrome is named for the unusual constriction of the X
chromosome. It is one of the most common monogenic forms of mental
retardation. It is an X-linked disorder with a prevalence of one in 2,000 males
and a carrier prevalence of one in 1,000 females. About one-third of carrier
females show some milder form of mental retardation even though they will
not be affected severely. Despite great concerns in the genetics community,
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fragile X screening programs supported by commercial interests are already
under way in schools in Colorado and Georgia.
Genetic information also may be used at higher levels in the educational
process. Dr. Nancy Wexler, a well-known clinical psychologist and genetics
researcher, tells the story of a mother who brought her two at-risk teenage
children to a medical center to be tested for the Huntington's disease gene. It
is unusual to perform genetic testing on minor children for late-onset disorders.
Because Huntington's disease is a dominant disorder, each child had a fifty
percent risk, although of these two children neither or both of them could have
been affected. The mother said she wanted her children tested because she
could only afford to send one of them to college.
These same sort of difficult dilemmas also could arise in professional schools.
For example, medical schools make major investments in their students. As a
society, we do not begin to recoup the cost of paying for medical education until
the individual has completed training and has been practicing for a number of
year6. Would it be legal or ethical for a medical school to refuse to admit a
student who already had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS, also known as
Lou Gehrig's disease), where the mean survival after diagnosis is only two to
five years? If denying admission to such an individual would not be
unreasonable, what about denying admission to an individual who was
presymptomatic for ALS and was likely to develop the disease within ten
years? What about other late-onset disorders, such as myotonic dystrophy?
When, if at all, would it be acceptable to use genetic information as a basis for
admissions, internships, residency placements, or other aspects of medical
education?
G. Criminal Justice
I have already discussed the forensic use of DNA evidence for identification.
There are two other, less well-analyzed, areas of criminal justice in which
genetic information also may be relevant. The first is the use of a defendant's
genotype as a defense. The attempt to use the XYY defense, which began in the
1960's, presents an historical precedent. The theory that men with an extra Y
chromosome are predisposed to violent or criminal behavior has now been
thoroughly discredited. More recently, however, other types of genetic
information have been proffered to bolster an insanity defense in much the
same way that evidence of organic brain disease is used today.
The second possible application of genetic information is in parole hearings.
Suppose that, at some point, geneticists are able to identify genetic factors that
predispose an individual to violent behavior. Would it be permissible for a
parole board to consider this information in assessing the individual's
likelihood of recidivism? Thus, the use of genetic information in this context
would raise a number of constitutional issues.
H. Tort Litigation
With new genetic discoveries being introduced into the clinical setting, the
standard of care in medicine will continue to change. Consequently, there are
likely to be a greater number of medical malpractice, wrongful life, wrongful
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birth, and other causes of action based on genetic medicine. There are other
ways, however, in which genetic information may affect tort law.
The first involves the proof of causation. For example, a case was filed in
California in 1990 on behalf of a child who was born with microcephaly, an
abnormally small head. He also had severe mental retardation and an IQ of 40.
The child's mother alleged that the child's birth defects were caused by her
prenatal workplace exposure to chemicals at the defendant's plant.
Consequently, a products liability action was brought seeking $5.6 million in
damages against the mother's employer as well as several manufacturers of
the chemicals to which she was exposed.
The defendants' experts asserted that the child's symptoms seemed to be
remarkably similar to those of a child with fragile X syndrome, and they filed
a motion to require the child to undergo genetic testing. The court ordered the
genetic testing over the objection of the plaintiff. This example illustrates how
genetic information could be relevant to the issue of causation in personal
injury cases.
Another possible use of genetic information involves damages. Suppose, as
a result of the defendant's negligence, a thirty year-old man with a $100,000 a
year income is run over while crossing the street and rendered totally disabled.
The starting point in assessing compensatory damages is lost income. In this
case, if the plaintiff had a work-life expectancy of forty years, then the damages
for lost income would be $4 million, exclusive of possible salary increases and
inflation. Now suppose that, because of some genetic trait, the defendant could
show that the plaintiff would not live to age seventy but could only be expected
to live to age forty. From the defendant's standpoint, this is a bonanza and
results in savings of at least $3 million. The potential magnitude of these
savings raises the issue of whether defendants might be tempted to engage in
genetic "fishing expeditions" in all personal injury actions where the damages
include future lost earnings or medical expenses. It is an open question,
however, whether genetic testing could be ordered during discovery or
whether certain genetic evidence, such as an increased risk of a multifactorial
disorder, would be admissible.
II. ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It is evident that the use of genetic information for nonmedical purposes
raises a variety of fascinating legal issues. In trying to resolve these issues it
may be valuable to formulate a series of broad ethical and policy principles for
guidance.
First, I would strongly suggest that we should not adopt any policies that
discourage at-risk people who want to undergo genetic testing from doing so
for fear of the nonmedical use of the information. It is already commonplace
for some people to forego genetic testing that they would prefer to have because
they are afraid that their employer or their insurance company will gain access
to the results. Other people pay in cash for genetic services or try to be tested
anonymously or without medical records being kept.
Second, wedo not want to adopt policies that coerce people who do notwant
to be tested into being tested. Genetic testing often creates great psychological,
personal, and social turmoil. People vary widely in whether they want to know
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about their likely future health. We should adopt policies that respect this
important aspect of individual autonomy.
Third, I think there is a great danger in misinterpretation of genetic
information by lay people. This concern applies to both single gene and
multifactorial disorders. Modem genetic concepts such as variable penetrance,
variable expressivity, latency, imprinting, and allelic expansion are difficult to
understand. Lay people should not be put in the position of making important
decisions affecting individuals based on genetic concepts that they do not fully
comprehend.
Fourth, there is a paramount individual privacy interest in genetic
information. There must be compelling reasons to require individuals to share
such innately personal information, and in the nonmedical context this may be
a difficult burden to meet.
Fifth, the confidentiality of genetic information must be maintained. Before
any genetic information is acquired, it should be clear as to whom the
information may be redisclosed. It has yet to be determined what rights
individuals have to keep genetic information confidential.
Sixth, we should act to preserve the quality of genetic testing and counseling.
Third parties using genetic information in the nonmedical setting do not have
the same interest in quality assurance as the individual being tested. By
applying less rigorous standards of genetic testing, or failing to provide
appropriate genetic counseling, there is a risk of both laboratory error and great
psychological harm.
Seventh, we should act to conserve medical resources. There are a finite
number of geneticists, genetic counselors, and genetic laboratories. There is
also a limited amount of money that reasonably should be spent on genetic
testing. Genetic resources should be allocated with the primary goal of
improving health rather than for various nonmedical purposes.
Eighth, we should be careful not to waste human resources. For example,
society loses when an individual currently in good health is rendered
unemployable because a genetic test indicates a risk of future health problems.
It is also unjust to base decisions allocating essential societal opportunities on
immutable biological characteristics. Merely drawing lines based on genes
creates a danger of stigmatization -- both on an intrafamilial and a societal basis.
Similarly, genetic discrimination would often be multigenerational and would
often fall along racial or ethnic lines.
Finally, the use of genetic information in nonmedical settings creates great
risks of unintended societal consequences. These include reductionism and
determinism, loss of equality of opportunity, and altered conceptions of
normality. Reductionism and determinism, as well as the other concepts, relate
to the question of what kind of society we are going to have when this tidal
wave of genetic information washes over us. Will we become a society of risk
takers who figure that we might as well start sky diving and alligator wrestling?
Or will we become a society of the paranoid, "worried well," who think that
every cough is the first sign of lung cancer?
1994-95]
120 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 9:109
IV. CONCLUSION
As I mentioned at the outset, the use of genetic information for medical
purposes raises enough profoundly difficult moral and legal issues. I think we
should be very careful before sanctioning the use of genetic information for
nonmedical purposes for the reasons I suggested and, perhaps more
importantly, for the numerous other reasons that we have yet to realize.
